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The inﬂuential role of international treaty secretariats in coordinating bureaucracies across jurisdictional
boundaries has been highlighted in recent years. While we now better understand how their inﬂuence
occurs, the ﬁeld still faces a substantial difﬁculty in answering the basic quantitative question of “how
inﬂuential?” By employing network analysis, we devised and tested a survey to quantify secretariat
inﬂuence within an international environmental regime. We applied the survey tool to two transboundary ﬁsheries governance networks in North America and here focus on the Great Lakes Fishery
Commission (GLFC) as our primary case study. The results demonstrate a high ability of treaty secretariat
to inﬂuence the management decisions of federal and state/provincial agencies. Primary interview data
collected with the GLFC secretariat staff helps explain this ﬁnding. This study advances the reconceptualization of secretariat inﬂuence via relational metrics, and offers a way to estimate secretariat
inﬂuence despite their typically veiled modes of operation.
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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1. Introduction
The study of international organizations (IOs) and their particular role in coordinating bureaucracies across jurisdictional
boundaries to realize collective outcomes has become increasingly
prominent in the ﬁelds of global environmental politics and public
administration (Bauer, 2006; Biermann and Siebenhüner, 2009;
Tallberg et al., 2013; Johnson, 2014; Knill and Bauer, 2016). In
particular, there is a growing body of scholarship on understanding
the role of international treaty secretariats (i.e., administrative
bodies set up to support the multilateral institutional arrangements
of IOs) and how they consequently impact (inter)governmental
policy processes and outcomes (Busch, 2014; Jinnah, 2014; Eckhard
and Ege, 2016; Tallberg et al., 2016). This has been mirrored by a
concurrently developing literature on public management networks examining the presence and effectiveness of leadership
exercised through network administrative (or “collaborative”) organizations. These second-order organizations, composed of
participant network members, bear interorganizational transaction

costs, distribute tasks, and facilitate collaborative processes (Provan
and Milward, 2001; Imperial, 2005; Van Meerkerk and Edelenbos,
2014). In the scholarly ﬁeld of international relations, the ascendance of the constructivist approach has enabled expanded conceptions of power and authority wielded by treaty secretariats,
greatly beyond the initial frames of state-centred ontology offered
by realists and neoliberals (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999, 2004;
Barnett and Duvall, 2005). That treaty secretariats do not merely ﬁll
an administrative function within given power structures, but that
they possess agency and autonomy in their own right (at least
partially) to inﬂuence and even shape state preferences, has been a
revelation in the ﬁeld and opened new possibilities for enhancing
the efﬁcacy of global governance (e.g. Jinnah, 2010; Michaelowa
and Michaelowa, 2017). Analysts have usefully identiﬁed and
debated the sources of authority for treaty secretariats as well as
the mechanisms and types of inﬂuence often observed, despite the
admission that they nevertheless operate under a veil of neutrality
and member state delegation (Depledge, 2007; Biermann and
Siebenhüner, 2009). A number of important explanatory variables
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of relational metrics with a view to advancing the network-based
understanding of an international environmental regime.
The next section brieﬂy traces the existing methods used to
assess the inﬂuence of treaty secretariats. We then describe the
survey method developed to directly assess secretariat inﬂuence,
along with a qualitative interview component, and present the case
study in detail. Results are then analysed and discussed, revealing
the level of secretariat inﬂuence and providing insight to the key
organizational traits and activities leveraged to generate this
inﬂuence.

for the inﬂuence of secretariats have subsequently been proposed
to illuminate how they increase inﬂuence and why such inﬂuence
may vary across organizations. These include the ability to draw on
moral authority and shared worldviews, control of information
ﬂow, and being a holder of institutional memory and specialized
knowledge pertaining to scientiﬁc, procedural and diplomatic
expertise (see Barnett and Finnemore, 1999; Biermann and
Siebenhüner, 2009).
While constituting what has been previously described as an
energized research ﬁeld (see Eckhard and Ege, 2016 for a recent
review), there remain important unanswered questions concerning
secretariat inﬂuence. For example, how best to ascertain the level of
secretariat inﬂuence against that of other actors within an international regime, such as national and subnational agencies, has not
been sufﬁciently explored. To the best of our knowledge, no direct
empirical research approach has been provided in the literature to
measure, quantify, and compare secretariat inﬂuence. Instead,
determining the extent or reach of inﬂuence has mainly relied on
the use of in-depth case studies employing interviews with secretariat staff, participant observation, and reviews of ofﬁcial speeches
and documents to enable process tracing and counterfactual analysis (i.e. whether there are any changes in policies, institutions,
relationships, and/or norms in the regime, whether these changes
can be attributed to the secretariat's observed mechanisms of inﬂuence, and whether alternative explanations that do not involve
secretariats can be ruled out) (e.g. see Underdal, 2001; Biermann
and Siebenhüner, 2009; Jinnah, 2014). While such an intensive
approach can be suitable for elucidating the causal mechanisms
that help reveal the strategies that secretariats use to exercise inﬂuence, it does not offer a way to assess the fundamental question
of how inﬂuential? A large part of this methodological difﬁculty
stems from the ‘behind the scenes’ character of treaty secretariats,
which often operate through informal and less public channels. For
example, because they do not explicitly announce preferences as
part of their mandate, it is more difﬁcult to estimate and evaluate
their overt intention and therefore isolate their unique inﬂuence on
interorganizational policy outcomes.
This study aims to address this research gap by developing and
testing a network-based survey method capable of measuring and
comparing secretariat inﬂuence. What we espouse is a relational
methodology which treats inﬂuence as an outcome rather than an
attribute. This perspective considers inﬂuence to be something that
only materializes when others are connected and affected by one's
action, not when one simply ‘possesses’ it. Method-wise, it builds
on recent studies assessing secretariat inﬂuence among a network
of state and non-state organizations using Twitter-derived data to
€rgens et al., 2016; Kolleck et al.,
depict network structure (see Jo
2017). We take this body of work a step further by implementing
an online survey designed to enable a more direct and purposeful
estimation of inﬂuence within a given environmental regime. The
case study of the Great Lakes Fishery Commission (GLFC) is presented below, which comprises a binational treaty secretariat
aimed at facilitating transboundary ﬁsheries governance in the
Great Lakes region of North America. The results demonstrate a
relatively high ability of the GLFC secretariat to inﬂuence the
management decisions of federal and state/provincial agencies. We
contextualize this quantitative estimation by analysing primary
interview data collected with the GLFC secretariat staff to reveal the
relational origin and persistence of such interorganizational inﬂuence. We highlight two factors e the non-substitutable functions
and convening power of the secretariat. Together, this study offers
an innovative reconceptualization of secretariat inﬂuence in terms

2. Theory and methodology
2.1. Understanding and measuring secretariat inﬂuence
In understanding the inﬂuence exerted by international treaty
secretariats and exploring ways to study it, an important observation has arisen. Because states had agreed to form a treaty and
created a secretariat to administer treaty work by funding it, secretariats are not expected to have a voice of their own, but rather
act as an “international servant” working to fulﬁl states’ interests in
a neutral and transparent manner. The mandates of these secretariats often tend to emphasize their logistical role while discouraging lobbying for any particular policy output or active
participation in the multilateral negotiations themselves
(Depledge, 2005; Busch, 2009). The potential for autonomous inﬂuence therefore challenges a fundamental tenet of how secretariats are supposed to derive legitimacy, i.e., via political neutrality
(Abbott and Snidal, 1998; Mathiason, 2007; Bauer et al., 2012). Yet,
as is well known, many secretariats (particularly in the environment sphere) perform a suite of authoritative functions, albeit in
the background, that may affect state decisions (e.g. draft agendas,
ﬁlter information, fund research, and frame policy ideas). Paradoxically, secretariat inﬂuence stems from this restrained aspect of
secretariat politics, that is, through activities that are often unseen,
informal and obscured (Jinnah, 2014).
Owing to such “veiled” characteristics of secretariats when it
comes to deploying inﬂuence, conventional measures of ascertaining the extent of inﬂuence through qualitative and researcherdriven techniques (e.g. interviews, observation and document
analysis, as done in Biermann and Siebenhüner, 2009; Jinnah, 2014)
have had difﬁculty generating an explicit picture of who is more
€ rgens et al. (2016, p.
inﬂuential and by how much. Particularly, Jo
982) notes that attempts at directly understanding hidden preferences through statements and observed behaviour from staff and
documentation can be biased in one of two opposing directions e
secretariat inﬂuence being either inﬂated or discounted. While
advocacy-oriented administrators may exaggerate the policy impacts the secretariat generates for reputational gains, others are
likely to downplay its effect to preserve an image of impartiality on
which their authority depends (see for example, Bauer, 2009;
Busch, 2009; Jinnah, 2011; Conliffe, 2011). In fact, Jinnah (2014, p.
21) avers that “secretariats often go to great lengths to conceal any
activities that reﬂect their own political preferences.”
€rgens, KolIn acknowledging this methodological challenge, Jo
leck and colleagues took a different approach, aiming to infer inﬂuence from one's relative position or status in the communication
€ rgens et al., 2016;
networks that form an international regime (Jo
Kolleck, 2016; Kolleck et al., 2017). In so doing, the concept of inﬂuence was rephrased as the interactive pull through which
behavioural change is induced between a group of actors. Such an
analysis utilizes the broader structure of social relationships or
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Conducting the survey ﬁrst requires compiling a list of relevant
organizations that comprise a governance network (e.g. [sub]national government agencies, and treaty secretariats that form part
of IOs). The survey would then begin by asking respondents to
select an organization to which s/he belongs from the list and then
asking to select all the agencies that they communicate with
formally or informally in their professional role. This communicative history forms an essential basis for establishing a “working
relationship”, however banal or sporadic. To determine if and how
much organizations included in the survey (including any treaty
secretariats) exercise inﬂuence across the network, the respondents are then prompted to complete the inﬂuence question
for all the relationships they speciﬁed in the preceding steps. We
consulted Cox and Jacobson's (1973, p. 3) classic deﬁnition of inﬂuence, “the modiﬁcation of one actor's behaviour by another”. Our
operationalization is also consistent with Jinnah (2014, p. 55)'s
concept of ‘moderate’ inﬂuence that refers to “a change in practices
not required by changes in ofﬁcial rules or widely adopted norms,”
and similar to the concept of double-loop social learning, consisting
of correcting errors by examining policies (Artmitage et al., 2008).
Furthermore, recent studies of inﬂuence within bureaucratic networks shows that it occurs differently through formal and informal
channels (Temby et al., 2017; Song et al., 2019b). These differences
were operationalized in the survey, which formulated the following
two variables to measure interorganizational inﬂuence:

linkages that make up a governance network, rather than focusing
on the open statements, resources and strategies of individual
secretariats themselves (Isett et al., 2011; Verweij et al., 2013;
Koliba et al., 2019). Casting political inﬂuence in these relational
terms and highlighting its interdependent nature has subsequently
enabled a novel methodological operationalization.
One way of inferring inﬂuence from an actor's relational position in policy networks (rather than individual preferences or capacities) involves using social network analysis. For example,
€ rgens and colleagues used Twitter-derived data to explore the
Jo
communicative inﬂuence of the UN Climate Change secretariat
(under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
€ rgens et al., 2016; Kolleck et al., 2017). With vertices
Change) (Jo
representing Twitter users and edges indicating both ‘mentions’
and ‘retweets’, the authors applied the measures of ‘betweenness
centrality’ and ‘eigenvector centrality’ to identify the most central
Twitter users, those whose tweets connect a number of clusters and
thus have the greatest chance at exerting inﬂuence. The analyses
not only empirically demonstrated the feasibility of taking a
network-relational approach, but also found that the secretariat
under study occupied a unique and central ‘brokering’ position in
climate change issue-speciﬁc policy debates, suggesting a dominant role in affecting and connecting multiple stakeholder groups.
While being innovative, this approach is in its relative infancy.
Moreover, when concerned with ascertaining the extent of interorganizational inﬂuence, the use of social network analysis via
Twitter data offers limited appeal in at least two ways. First, the
issue-speciﬁc communication networks depicted on Twitter are an
oversimpliﬁed proxy of the actual professional network underlying
international policy-making. Notwithstanding the brief word limit
on each communication (i.e. each [re]tweet), the Twitter exchange
is one, and likely a minor, dimension of information exchange
taking place in an international treaty regime, with more substantive and consequential discussions carried out through meetings, phone calls, speeches, formal memos, and informal
conversations that form the suite of verbal and written communi€rgens et al. (2016, p. 986) acknowledges that the
cation occurring. Jo
use of Twitter data is more relevant for debates about general
principles of an issue rather than about its technical and political
details (e.g. see Saerbeck et al., 2020 which uses non-Twitter,
original survey data). Secondly, social network analysis does not
measure inﬂuence directly, but only infers it from an actor's position in a policy network, that is, “a central position of an actor is at
best interpreted as a sign of empowering other actors and facilitating coalition-building, rather than direct inﬂuence on the policy
€ rgens et al., 2016, p. 986).
outputs of multilateral negotiations” (Jo
Hence, it fails to describe the tangible impact of treaty secretariats.

- How often has communicating with people in the following
organizations through informal channels (e.g. chance conversations, spontaneous meetings, personal notes, emails and
phone calls, drinks after work) led you to make professional
choices or decisions that you would not have otherwise made?
- How often has communicating with people in the following
organizations through formal channels (e.g., committee meetings, memos, ofﬁcial verbal or written business communication)
led you to make professional choices or decisions that you
would not have otherwise made?”
Although respondents represented themselves with selfidentiﬁed afﬁliated organizations, their referents for these questions were the organizations with which they interact. Because
each respondent is answering these two questions for all the organizations listed in the survey, the survey generates directional
information about communication and inﬂuence on one-to-many
relations. By collating all responses, this survey design permits
capturing the extent of inﬂuence across a group of organizations, in
addition to being able to separate the level of inﬂuence for each
dyadic relationship. This was the basis for distinguishing IO secretariat inﬂuence from that of other organizations, and also being
able to compare it with others.
The key informant interviews conducted with secretariat staff
focused on probing relational explanations of secretariat inﬂuence.
According to Bruno Latour (1986), inﬂuence is never of one's own
making, but it only materializes through interactions and relationships with other parties, and only in the aftermath of being
conformed to. He stated, “when an actor simply has power [or inﬂuence] nothing happens and s/he is powerless; when, on the other
hand, an actor exerts power it is others who perform the action”
(ibid, p. 264). In other words, no matter how inﬂuential one appears
to be, it remains an illusion until others start to take action in
response, e.g. change one's behaviour or adjust decisions. In this
sense, inﬂuence must be treated as a consequence rather than as a
property that causes action. Such theorizing provides an interesting
alternative to the more mechanistic explanations of inﬂuence that
delve into the mandate of the secretariat and the resources available to it, as well as more structural considerations that include the

2.2. A direct approach to estimate inﬂuence via survey and
interview
Our contribution in this article is consistent with the networkinformed approach described above. The main innovation is that
we develop and utilize a survey to obtain exact data on interorganizational inﬂuence. A burgeoning literature on governance networks, epistemic communities and ‘post-bureaucratic organizations’
provides an extensive theoretical backdrop (e.g. Heckscher, 1994;
Agranoff and McGuire, 2001; Hafner-Burton et al., 2009; Isett et al.,
2011; Hass, 2015; Young, 2017; Koliba et al., 2019). Engaging with
this set of literature has enabled us to consider a more horizontal and
decentralized as well as knowledge-, trust- and communicationbased conceptualization of inﬂuence while supporting the design
of a related survey methodology to capture these nuanced interorganizational relations (see Temby et al., 2015; 2017; Song et al.,
2019a, 2019b; Lima et al., 2019 for a progression of earlier work).
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from its peak (GLFC, 2014a); it also uses approximately 75% of the
GLFC's annual budget. In its role as a science coordinator, the GLFC
funds the scientiﬁc studies of its choice, publishes summaries of the
current ‘state of scientiﬁc knowledge’ in areas of importance, and
communicates research ﬁndings to government through a variety
of media outlets (GLFC, 2014b). In maintaining working relationships, the GLFC facilitates meetings between state, provincial, and
federal agencies to share information as well as implements
dispute resolution mechanisms when agreement on ﬁshery policy
cannot be reached.
Fishery commissions such as the GLFC may play an important
role in enhancing transboundary governance capacity, but the
speciﬁcs of this role and the degree of their inﬂuence have not been
clariﬁed. Moreover, because IO research has tended to focus on a
subset of large, global and well-publicized actors such as the World
Bank and United Nations specialized agencies, smaller treaty secretariats with a more focused remit and a narrower set of state
jurisdictions have not sufﬁciently entered the empirical base of this
research ﬁeld (Haftel and Thompson, 2006; Eckhard and Ege, 2016).
Considering that the number of existing binational environmental
agreements in the world far surpasses that of multilateral ones
(2,296 vs. 1,344, according to the International Environmental
Agreements Database Project, https://iea.uoregon.edu), we expect
that empirical studies of binational ﬁshery commissions will
contribute to the understanding of international environmental
treaties and their operations. After a brief description of study
methods, the following section assesses GLFC's inﬂuence using
survey data, complemented by the interview results that help
explain the comparatively high inﬂuence detected.

problem structure, the polity framework, and the organizational
procedures and cultures (Biermann and Siebenhüner, 2009). We
shed light on this novel perspective by drawing on the case of the
Great Lakes Fishery Commission.
3. Case study
Scholars of North American environmental politics have begun
to view transboundary, multilateral environmental issues as complex problems, where multiple agencies within and between governments attempt to collaborate to bring about desired outcomes,
and in which treaty secretariats behave entrepreneurially to
maintain relevance, spotlighting particular problems or serving an
interjurisdictional coordinating role (see Healy et al., 2014;
VanNijnatten and Craik, 2015; Norman, 2015; Temby and Stoett,
2017; Young, 2017; Brooks and Olive, 2018). Several studies have
highlighted the role of IOs and their secretariats within the proliferating number of environmental governance networks. This has
included research on binational ﬁshery commissions (Temby et al.,
2015; Song et al., 2017), the trinational Commission for Environmental Cooperation (Simon, 2014; Jinnah and Lindsay, 2015) and
binational boundary water commissions (Clamen and Macfarlane,
2015). However, aside from Jinnah and Lindsay's (2015) study of
NAFTA inﬂuence, and Don Munton's (2006, 2007) critical analyses
of Canada-U.S. Air Quality Committee, they have not directly
examined organizational inﬂuence. And those that have done so
have used process tracing case studies rather than surveys of
network participants.
3.1. Great Lakes Fishery Commission (GLFC)

3.2. Survey description
The Great Lakes Fishery Commission is a binational commission
comprised of representatives from the United States and Canada
with a mandate to establish “working arrangements” among governments (the Great Lakes fall under the jurisdiction of two nations, eight US states, one Canadian province, and several tribes), to
ensure multi-jurisdictional ﬁshery management (GLFC, 2019). According to the website of the GLFC (2019): “The commission
became a focal point for cooperative Great Lakes ﬁshery management, though was designed speciﬁcally to not supersede existing
state or provincial management authority”. The GLFC was established through a binational treaty, the 1954 Convention on Great
Lakes Fisheries (Gaden et al., 2013), signed in response to the
severity of the sea lamprey invasion that devastated both the
commercial and recreational ﬁsheries. In 1981, the original Joint
Strategic Plan for Management of Great Lakes Fisheries was
developed and signed by all major federal, state, provincial and
tribal jurisdictions (updated in 1997) to provide a strategic, though
nonbinding, means through which to manage the Great Lakes
ﬁshery across political boundaries as an ecosystem. The GLFC is
headed by commissioners appointed by each of the two countries
and supported by technical committees as well as Lake Committees
that focus on the lake-speciﬁc management of each Great Lake. The
Lake Committee representatives from all ﬁve lakes then form the
Council of Lake Committees, representing a unifying body to
address basin-wide issues such as sea lamprey control (GLFC, 2019).
The GLFC secretariat is comprised of approximately 20e25
permanent staff, and is located in Ann Arbor, Michigan. The GLFC
secretariat has three main tasks, as outlined in the Convention.
Namely, it implements a program of sea lamprey control, coordinates and conducts science, and maintains working relationships with government agencies and other public management
organizations. The sea lamprey control program is the activity for
which the GLFC owes much of its positive reputation. It has been
successful at reducing the presence of the invasive species by 90%

We used an online survey tool (‘LimeSurvey’) to target civil
servants working in the public sector management of the Great
Lakes Fishery. Individuals were selected based on their afﬁliation
with the preselected organizations and their role related to ﬁshery
governance. These included employees afﬁliated with state/provincial and federal agencies on both sides of the Canada-US border
as well as inter-governmental and tribal organizations. The names
and email addresses of the potential respondents within these organizations were identiﬁed from publicly accessible reports and
online documentation. They were contacted by email with an
invitation explaining the purpose of the survey and with a link to
the online survey instrument. A total of 45 organizations were
included in the study. They comprised binational organizations
such as the International Joint Commission and the Great Lakes
Fishery Commission, tribal organizations such as the Great Lakes
Indian Fish and Wildlife Commission, federal agencies such as
Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Natural Resources Canada, the U.S.
Geological Survey and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and subnational entities including the Ontario Ministry of Environment
and Climate Change, and the Michigan Department of Natural Resources (see Fig. 1 for a full agency list). Of these, most respondents
reported afﬁliations in agencies within the U.S. federal government
(18%), the Canadian federal government (13%), the U.S. states of
Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin, New York, Indiana, Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Minnesota (46%), and the Ontario government (19%). A
small percentage of respondents (<4%) reported primary afﬁliation
with inter-state or binational organizations. Fewer than 2% of the
respondents were from members of tribal ﬁshery organizations.
The survey was conducted between October and November of 2015,
and resulted in 226 completed surveys. All responses were anonymous with no names or other identiﬁable information collected
other than professional afﬁliation (see Song et al., 2019b for other
details of survey processes).
4
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Fig. 1. Interjurisdictional communication pattern for governance networks pertaining to the Great Lakes ﬁsheries.

interjurisdictional communication reported for each jurisdiction
(i.e., the redder the colour, the greater frequency of communication
one node is associated with other jurisdictions). The distance between nodes indicates the intensity of relatedness, such that closely
located nodes imply a proportionally higher occurrence of
communication between them.
Fig. 1 displays the overall patterns of communication. Interestingly, the patterns mimic the geographical layout of the region itself, with respondents in adjacent jurisdictions shown to
communicate most frequently with each other (i.e. indicated by
shorter distances between nodes). For the purpose of this paper, the
central placement of the GLFC among the multiple jurisdictions
comprising the regime is noteworthy. Despite the lower number of
reported communication linkages associated with the GLFC (549,
light yellow colour) compared to, for instance, US Federal (2,009),
Michigan (1,311), and Ontario (1,020), the communicative pattern
suggests a strategic position through which it can reach all actors in
the network. The government dominated communication patterns
shown in Fig. 1 are not surprising given that typically a greater
range of responsibilities and resources are at the disposal of federal
and state agencies compared to international treaty secretariats.
Still, what is striking is the centrality of the GLFC, implying strength
of relation with most other jurisdictions in the network and subsequently a network-facilitating role (see van Eck and Waltman,
2010 for details of the mapping technique). This is especially so
considering the marginal positions of the Canadian federal and
Ontario agencies despite their role in managing four of the ﬁve
Great Lakes. Based on this result, it appears that the GLFC, along
with U.S. federal and Michigan, is playing the role of “hub” or
“broker” through which interjurisdictional communication is being
carried out. A similar ﬁnding that reveals the intermediate position

A similar survey was also conducted in the context of the
binational Paciﬁc Salmon Commission (see Temby et al., 2015), the
details and results of which are presented in Appendix to enable
comparison and provide additional insight to the internal validity
of the survey measures and external validity of the GLFC case study
results.

3.3. Survey analyses and results
3.3.1. Aggregate patterns of communication
To produce the overall display of network connectivity as
determined by the communicative patterns of the surveyed
agencies, ﬁrst, the weighted frequencies of formal and informal
communication indicated by each respondent (i.e., 2 ¼ regularly,
1 ¼ occasionally, 0 ¼ never) were tallied.
For the 226 respondents who participated in the Great Lakes
survey, a total of 1828 formal and 1536 informal communication
linkages were reported. From this, both the agencies with which
each respondent was afﬁliated and with which she communicated
were noted and classiﬁed according to the jurisdiction to which the
agencies belong (with binational [not including the GLFC] indicated
as [BI] and tribal as [TR]). Summation of this dyadic data resulted in
a network conﬁguration of 14 nodes, generating a 14  14 adjacency matrix. Important to emphasize is that it is not the number of
individual respondents that are being aggregated, but the
communication linkages reported by each respondent. Differently
put, what we are measuring is the reported communication with
target jurisdiction, not simply the volume of communication by the
respondent's home afﬁliation. Fig. 1 presents the distribution of
interjurisdictional communication in the form of density visualization using VOSviewer 1.6.0. Node colour denotes the level of
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Table 1
The Effects of Formal & Informal Communication in the Great Lakes (Note: Standard errors in parenthesis).
Type

Organization

IOs

International Joint Commission (IJC)
Great Lakes Fishery Commission (GLFC)
US
US Geological Survey (USGS)
Federal
US Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS)
US Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA)
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
US Army Corp of Engineers (USACE)
Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO)
Canada
Federal
Environment Canada (ENVCAN)
US
Michigan Department of Natural Resources (MIDNR)
Subnational
Minnesota Department of Natural Resources (MNDNR)
New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (NYSDEC)
Ohio Department of Natural Resources (OHDNR)
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (WIDNR)
Canada Subnational Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources and Forestry (OMNRF)

Percent Communicating Occasional Regular
þ Regular Informal
Inﬂuence
Informal
Inﬂuence

Occasional Regular
þ Regular Formal
Inﬂuence
Formal
Inﬂuence

.323
.615
.553
.708
.535
.381
.412
.549
.389
.518
.336
.389
.336
.381
.566

.493
.813
.832
.819
.686
.500
.667
.710
.636
.769
.618
.682
.671
.547
.805

.384
.640
.720
.706
.471
.407
.398
.613
.511
.650
.553
.568
.579
.605
.680

(.057)
(.041)
(.040)
(.036)
(.045)
(.053)
(.051)
(.044)
(.053)
(.044)
(.057)
(.053)
(.057)
(.053)
(.041)

.014
.173
.184
.181
.107
.070
.065
.113
.091
.120
.079
.205
.105
.151
.148

(.014)
(.032)
(.035)
(.030)
(.028)
(.028)
(.026)
(.028)
(.031)
(.030)
(.031)
(.043)
(.035)
(.039)
(.031)

(.059)
(.033)
(.033)
(.030)
(.042)
(.054)
(.049)
(.041)
(.051)
(.039)
(.056)
(.050)
(.054)
(.054)
(.035)

.068
.338
.248
.263
.182
.140
.108
.185
.159
.265
.092
.250
.224
.186
.336

(.055)
(.040)
(.039)
(.035)
(.035)
(.037)
(.032)
(.035)
(.039)
(.041)
(.033)
(.046)
(.048)
(.042)
(.042)

Fig. 2. Agency communication with each other, and communication-facilitated inﬂuence in the Great Lakes ﬁsheries policy network (*Occasional þ Regular Inﬂuence).

respondents who report communicating with the USFWS indicated
being regularly or occasionally inﬂuenced by this organization
through informal means (0.706), while 81.9% of them reported
regular or occasional inﬂuence through formal means (0.819).
The survey results reveal that the GLFC, as represented by its
secretariat, had a strong inﬂuence over the ﬁshery management
network. In terms of the percent communicating score, the GLFC
was only second to the USFWS, with 61.5% of the non-GLFC survey
participants reporting professional contact with the GLFC. Of
these respondents who claimed contact with the GLFC, 64% reported occasionally or regularly basing their decisions on what
was being communicated informally with the GLFC; this number
rises to 81.3% when inﬂuence through formal communication is
measured. Thus, while the GLFC's inﬂuence facilitated through
informal communication was noteworthy (5th out of the 15 displayed), its inﬂuence through formal communication was
considerably higher in comparative terms (3rd out of the 15, see
Fig. 2). This suggests that the GLFC can be considered one of the
most inﬂuential organizations in the network of agencies governing the Great Lakes ﬁshery, roughly equal to, if not more than,

of a treaty secretariat was observed in the survey of the Paciﬁc
Salmon Commission (see Appendix).
3.3.2. Estimating the size of inﬂuence
The survey results on interorganizational inﬂuence are presented in Table 1 and graphically in Fig. 2. They include scores for
the 15 (of the 45) organizations, who together represent 67% of all
interorganizational contact reported in the survey (that is, one third
of the organizations making up more than two thirds of the
communication linkages in the network). The speciﬁc percentage
for each organization is listed in the “percent communicating”
column. The four columns to the right of the percent communicating column in Table 1 indicate the degree of inﬂuence derived
from the self-assessment of staff of other organizations for the organization listed in the row, as measured by the survey questions.
We show combined occasional and regular inﬂuence through
informal channels; regular inﬂuence through informal channels;
combined occasional and regular inﬂuence through formal channels; and regular inﬂuence through formal channels. For example,
70.6% of non-US Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS)-employed
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work on an issue on which member government does not have ﬁrm
and solidiﬁed preferences. Great Lakes ﬁshery management is a
well-established problem for which governments have dedicated
bureaucracies with a record of articulated preferences. Interviewees indicated that this narrows the scope of inﬂuence, and
that GLFC ofﬁcials seek to appear facilitative rather than representative of a particular position. Two of the interviewees suggested that having regulatory authority (such as the ability to set
ﬁshing quotas) would undermine its apparent impartiality and
make it less trusted by the other partners.
Second, the GLFC not only has access to relevant decisionmaking forums in the basin-wide ﬁsheries management network
and in the capital cities of the two countries; its unique binational
presence has facilitated information exchange and relationshipbuilding among the government agencies through a wellattended meeting structure it created for the region. Identiﬁed as
a key source of inﬂuence for the GLFC (along with the ongoing
success of sea lamprey control), several secretariat staff spoke
extensively about the efﬁcacy of these meetings:

the highly funded Canada or U.S. federal agencies. We note similar
ﬁndings for the Paciﬁc Salmon Commission in another survey we
conducted in the context of transboundary Paciﬁc salmon ﬁsheries in western North America (see Appendix).
3.4. Understanding relational mechanisms of secretariat inﬂuence
To further probe the relational determinants of inﬂuence, semistructured interviews were conducted with twelve staff members
of the GLFC secretariat in December 2016. The interviewees’ roles
spanned diverse programs/expertise from ﬁsheries coordination to
scientiﬁc research to policy and legislative affairs. While the survey
analysis above revealed the extent of GLFC inﬂuence judged
directly by the other organizations in the network, and displayed in
an aggregate format, the interviews sought a reﬂexive perspective
of how the GLFC secretariat itself perceives its role, how it may
exercise inﬂuence across the policy and management network, and
the strategies for doing so. Examples of the questions include:

We have Lake Committee meetings, we have annual meetings,
we have the biennial meetings. A lot of that are different
members at different levels, but the Council Lake Committees,
the Lake Committees, these are everyone coming together,
people who are inﬂuencers, people who are decision-makers,
heads of DNRs [Departments of Natural Resources], giving the
authority to make these decisions or at least giving the ability to
take that information back to their decision-makers. (Respondent #7)

- How much latitude does the GLFC secretariat have in interpreting its mandate? How does it operate in relation to government parties?
- To what extent does the GLFC create or deﬁne new tasks for
itself, potentially expanding its mandate? What is the process
for doing this?
- Are the GLFC secretariat's main functions and programs replicated by any other international organizations or government
agencies? Or does it fulﬁll distinctive and non-substitutable
functions?

So, all of those meetings the structures had been in place for a
long time … And one of the things that astounded me when I
ﬁrst got involved in this organization [the GFLC] back in the
early 2000's was the discipline with which people came to
meetings … You go to the Council of Lake Committees meeting
and a 100 percent of the time a 100 percent of the jurisdictions
are represented. And the same right up and down the whole,
you know, tree. So, you ask yourself the question, why is that? As
things get busier, you know as people's agendas ﬁll up more and
more … teleconferencing has replaced face-to-face meetings …
it's easier to do things than it was before. Despite all of that,
people come to the meetings and they participate, they engage.
And so, when you think about it from that perspective, it's
because the stakes are high. If you don't participate in the
meetings within any of those layers, then you potentially miss
out on some pretty important decision-making about, you
know, anything to do with the management of the resource …
[T]hey can't afford not to participate. (Respondent #8)

The questions were broadly inspired by the sources and determinants of IO inﬂuence and power elaborated by Barnett and
Finnemore (2004) and Jinnah (2014). The interviews lasted 1 h on
average with the interviewees being assured of conﬁdentiality. Afterwards, they were transcribed and coded, and thematic analysis techniques were applied to elicit key narratives (i.e. Braun and Clarke, 2006).
Three main traits were identiﬁed. First, among those interviewed, there was a strong sense that the GLFC is uniquely binational and therefore irreplaceable. The fact that the GLFC has been
around for so long also seems to have contributed to its institutionalized status, which made it difﬁcult for interviewees to hypothetically consider what would take its place if it did not exist.
Members of the secretariat commented:
There's dozens and dozens of projects that are directly inﬂuencing ﬁshery management, so if the commission isn't coordinating this, who is? It falls apart because we are the only ones
that have that sort of international mandate, we can coordinate
across all of the boundaries across all of the jurisdictions. We can
deal with moving data, money, funding projects across boundaries, all of that. So, the answer is the commission is critical in
terms of that international oversight role … I think the basin will
be completely different without the commission playing that
sort of coordinating international role. (Respondent #10)

This understanding of inﬂuence is markedly relational in the
sense that it only emerges and persists insofar as state agencies
decide to participate. Once the discipline with which other agencies
engage in the process is lost (i.e. “if people started to not show up”),
there is a recognition that the Commission will begin to be undermined, as one interviewee puts it: “So if you had two jurisdictions
that didn't come all of a sudden, the integrity of the whole thing
starts to get compromised.” (Respondent #8) Hence, the maintenance of this convening power is a critical element of GLFC inﬂuence.
Third, Barnett and Finnemore (2004) argue that IOs that are viewed
as legitimate by governments are more able to exercise inﬂuence
through the shaping of how issues are understood. In the case of the
GLFC, through the secretariat activity of creating, coordinating and
supporting the communicative structure across the entire network that
is basin-wide, it appears that the GLFC has acquired a crucial means of
shaping information and framing perceptions of the issues that affect

You would probably backtrack by 50 or 60 years, with people
then creating alliances and trying to get their own e this [the
GLFC] is the mechanism that has been established and facilitated that conversation. (Respondent #7)
This view corroborates with Jinnah (2014) who argued that the
secretariats of IOs are more inﬂuential if they perform functions
that are not easily substitutable by another organization participating in a network governing a given issue. The other determinant
of secretariat inﬂuence in Jinnah's theory is whether secretariats
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cooperation, all leading to something that looks like e well, it could
be expressed as inﬂuence, but that's one descriptive word of a much
bigger diamond that has lots of facets” (Respondent #9).
Two factors appear crucial in generating this outcome. One is
the legitimacy and ostensive impartiality derived from the GLFC's
long-proven ability to share a broader binational perspective. The
GLFC (both the secretariat and the commissioners) has built a
reputation of speaking and acting for the collective interests of the
Great Lakes basin, hence being viewed as something of a ‘spokesperson’ for the common, interconnected ﬁsheries issues. This is not
the authority to manage the ﬁshery per se, but the authority to set
up working arrangements to bring about better transboundary
ﬁsheries management. Subsequently, being in contact with the
GLFC has given individual agencies or jurisdictions a compelling
incentive to consider what other states or the entire region is doing
before deciding and taking on management actions. Hence, a long
history of credibility on the part of the treaty secretariat has likely
attracted signiﬁcant body of listeners.
Another notable feature in the functioning of the Great Lakes
ﬁshery governance network is the occurrence of afﬁnitive trust (i.e.
a type of trust built on informality, familiarity and long-term interactions) which is shown to enhance one's aptitude to inﬂuence
decision-making of others, as facilitated via communication (Song
et al., 2019b). As shown in Fig. 2, the GLFC is an agency with the
second highest proportion of communication linkages reported in
the network, suggesting its potential to be inﬂuential amid the
occurrence of trusting relationships among agencies (see also
Leonard et al., 2011; Mulvaney et al., 2015). Indeed, collegial or
personal relationships abound and are particularly valued in the
Great Lakes ﬁshery regime, where its community of professionals is
likened to an epistemic community who “speak the same language” (Gaden et al., 2013). As an entity relied upon by others to
coordinate these valued interactions, the GLFC is ‘on the front foot’
to shape information and perceptions of the issues, oversee diffusion of norms as well as inﬂuence the broad policy agenda (sensu
Barnett and Finnemore, 2004). Likewise, as detailed in Appendix,
the organization of the Paciﬁc Salmon Commission (PSC) into a
committee and panel structure, which brings together government
managers, scientists, and representatives of ﬁshing industry, combined with the existence of long-standing relationships among the
participants, are noted to have similarly contributed to the effectiveness of the PSC in managing multi-jurisdictional coordination
(McRae, 2010; Temby et al., 2015; Song et al., 2017).
What emerges from this study, therefore, is the salience of a
relational structure of a governance network and the cooperative
makeup of interactions built on mutual dependence and close relationships, which provides a source of inﬂuence for those entrusted
to coordinate the exchanges. This is consistent with the conclusions of
a general network scholarship which has shown network involvement, or embeddedness in a network, is positively related to key
organizational outcomes such as trustworthiness, reputation and
inﬂuence (Provan et al., 2012). Ironically, the strength of this approach
may also pose as a limitation, for relationally derived inﬂuence would
require relationship-building as a prerequisite. For the GLFC (and the
PSC presented in Appendix), the backdrop of generally amicable
binational relations between Canada and the USA, along with the
perpetuation of the same language and similar culture, have all likely
made them easier to function this way. For a multilateral treaty that
draws together jurisdictions from different continents, histories,
languages and economic standards of living, however, an international organization may undergo a more onerous process of engendering interorganizational trust and recognized interdependence,
and therefore of deriving networked inﬂuence. Thus, how and to what
degree secretariat inﬂuence in the relational sense develops in a
multilateral setting with a more diverse range of actors represents a

other parties. In the words of the interviewees, this was described as:
People get to know people, relationships are built, there's
credibility. It's all brought about because of the way the commission has structured the lake committees and helps facilitate
their interaction; people get to know each other very well and
that way you can lay the cards on the table and work together to
achieve the goals … (Respondent #11)
We [the GLFC secretariat] have the ability to shape some of the
thinking … because we tend to speak for the collective basin and
so, I think generally, the commission is viewed as being a
spokesperson for our partners for the other agencies … I don't
think it's this ability to control thinking, I think it's an ability to
share a broader perspective and a history of doing that that
provided us with a great deal of inﬂuence in directing some of
these policy or science. (Respondent #5)

4. Discussion and conclusions
By approaching inﬂuence as a relationally derived construct in a
network setting, this study devised and tested a survey that achieved
a quantitative assessment of treaty secretariat inﬂuence. In this way,
how inﬂuential is less a question of resources at disposal, the mandate
of the secretariat, or its organizational cultures, but more directly
pertains to how government agencies, who typically possess regulatory authority as well as larger budget and personnel, regard the
secretariat as impactful. In other words, inﬂuence materializes to the
degree that other organizations in the governance network judge
their (internal) decision-making to be inﬂuenced by the work of the
secretariat. An application of the designed survey to the binational
Great Lakes Fishery Commission demonstrated a considerable degree
of inﬂuence exerted by the secretariat e a ﬁnding essentially obtained
by the members of the policy network expressing so. The comparatively high level of inﬂuence of this treaty secretariat, together with
being the locus of interjurisdictional communication (a ﬁnding
replicated in the case of the Paciﬁc Salmon Commission survey results
presented in Appendix) echoes a recent analysis of the global climate
governance structure wherein the secretariat of the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change is ranked “sixth” in terms
of the ability to inﬂuence the ﬂow and content of policy-relevant
knowledge within its stakeholder network (Saerbeck et al., 2020).
Our result also corroborates previous ﬁndings based on qualitative
methods, supporting their observations of the unique capability of a
treaty secretariat in directing some of the policy or science (see Bauer,
2006; Biermann and Siebenhüner, 2009; Busch, 2014; Jinnah, 2014;
Eckhard and Ege, 2016). This is an interesting and useful conﬁrmation
given the expectation of secretariats to downplay their inﬂuence and
states’ reticence to formally acknowledge secretariat inﬂuence. Yet in
this case, elicitation of direct expression of inﬂuence was possible
through our survey method.
Probing deeper, through key informant interviews, our study
sought explanations of how this inﬂuence may come to be relationally derived. Findings from the GLFC secretariat suggest that a
major means through which a secretariat can generate and maintain
the control of the network, shape agendas, and intervene in regional
priorities, is through ensuring robust attendance in the meeting
structure it has convened and led for over half a century. The systematic meeting structures which strive to ensure participation of all
levels of regulatory bureaucracy has served as a source of authority
and legitimacy for the GLFC, as a member of the secretariat highlighted: “we have a combination of ﬁduciary and environmental
responsibility and social interactions that all form kind of a nexus …
It's a combination of collaboration, communication, coordination,
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multiple survey applications would be valuable.
Binational ﬁshery commissions are a sub-continental organization focused on a speciﬁc natural resource base with smaller staff,
budget and international reputation on offer. In the case of the
GLFC, while it enjoys low substitutability, it nevertheless operates
in areas of high preference solidiﬁcation, meaning ﬁshery challenges have existed for many decades for the national and subnational governments to develop a set of preferences for how ﬁsheries
should be managed. While such hypotheses may suggest sizable
hurdles to overcome for small treaty secretariats in generating inﬂuence over other government entities, an exploration of the
relational methodology above shows otherwise. Through
convening power developed over decades of trust-building effort
and the development of supporting management control mechanisms, the ability of the GLFC secretariat to steer norms and ideas
and shape relationships across jurisdictional boundaries could be
demonstrated. The results contribute to the deepening pool of evidence suggesting the high salience of IOs (of any size) in shaping
decision-making within cooperative environmental regimes.
Importantly, the relational approach is a useful research avenue
through which one can attempt to directly elucidate the degree and
reach of international treaty secretariat inﬂuence e an approach
that would beneﬁt from further sharpening and empirical testing.

useful direction for future research.
Situating the ﬁndings of this study within the existing understanding of secretariat inﬂuence yields additional insights. As discussed above, Jinnah (2014)'s theory of IO secretariat inﬂuence
proposes two master variables explaining variation in inﬂuence,
namely, preference solidiﬁcation and the substitutability of functions. The fact that the multitude of challenges facing the Great
Lakes ﬁshery have a more than century-long history suggests that
preferences on issues like ﬁsh stocking and harvesting limits would
be well-deﬁned. In fact, in the 1960s, the GLFC would set ﬁshing
quotas (although it did not have the formal authority to do so)
because no one else had sufﬁcient knowledge. Now, the state
parties have quota preferences with which they come to the table.
Even the issue for which the GLFC was explicitly created to address,
the sea lamprey invasion, has a more than 70-year history. Thus, the
GLFC secretariat operates in the context of solidiﬁed preferences,
and Jinnah's theory would predict this to limit inﬂuence. The evidence here suggests, however, that the secretariat has adapted to
steer policy more adeptly with its own institutional maturation.
With regard to the substitutability of functions, the GLFC secretariat's facilitation of policy coordination is relevant. History has
shown that, in the absence of a coordinating organization, such as
the GLFC, there would be fragmented parochialism (Gaden et al.,
2013). The GLFC may perhaps be replaced by a more robust
Canada-US transnational network; however, considering the fact
that the GLFC is used even in the U.S. subnational context to coordinate policy in state waters, it is probably hard to dispense with.
The alternative would be a working group without a treaty secretariat, with state/provincial resources, doing the coordinating. But
given that the eight states and Ontario need to coordinate
ecosystem management and the stocking and ﬁshing quota setting
of speciﬁc ﬁsh species, this does not seem realistic. Neither does
giving the task to the International Joint Commission or Great Lakes
Commission, each of which is not scaled appropriately and do not
have the knowledge the GLFC has. The GLFC secretariat performs
two other important functions on an ongoing basis. If the GLFC did
not do these, it would leave a void in leadership in this area. First,
for now, no other organization has the expertise to do sea lamprey
management. Because it involves canals and dams in subnational
waters and the coordinated chemical treatment of the lakes with
lampricide, it would require something that may end up looking a
lot like the GLFC. Second, the GLFC secretariat funds scientiﬁc
studies and commissions papers synthesizing the state of scientiﬁc
knowledge on a range of topics. This represents an important, yet
subtle, form of technocratic power. Without this work, less
knowledge of Great Lakes ﬁsheries would be produced by scientists
and it would likely be more fragmented e in terms of not centrally
coordinated, and not centrally framed by way of synthesis reports.
There are certain limitations of our methodology. It is worth
noting that the depiction of a governance network as pursued in
this study is not perfect, given that the survey relied on respondents' voluntary participation while based on nonrandomized, purposive sampling. What is attained is therefore a
partial picture of the ‘true’ communicative relations and interorganizational inﬂuence in the regime. Nevertheless, because
capturing all organizations and every pertinent agency staff in the
data is often not a feasible strategy and because estimating the
structure of a network itself is one of the major aims of networkbased analysis, this constraint is grounded well within the generally implied caveat of network methodology (e.g. this also applies
€rgens et al., 2016; Kolleck
to Twitter-generated network data, see Jo
et al., 2017). In addition, to show any changing trends of secretariat
inﬂuence over time, a longitudinal design that incorporates
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APPENDIX
We also conducted a survey of the transboundary ﬁshery policy
network governing Paciﬁc salmon ﬁsheries in western North
America. In what follows we summarize the results to offer a degree of insight to the external validity and potential generalizability
of our Great Lakes survey ﬁndings to other treaty secretariats.
Paciﬁc Salmon Commission (PSC)
The PSC was originally created in 1937 as the International Paciﬁc Salmon Fisheries Commission and has existed in its current
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professional afﬁliation (see [masked for blind review] for other
details of survey processes).
We identiﬁed 30 organizations as relevant public agencies that
potentially formed the Paciﬁc salmon ﬁsheries governance
network. They included Paciﬁc Salmon Commission, US National
Marine Fisheries Service, Alaska Department of Environmental
Conservation and Fisheries and Oceans Canada (see Figure A.1 for a
full list of agencies included in the survey). The preponderance of
its respondents was from agencies belonging to the US federal
government (20%), the Canadian federal government (16%), the
state of Alaska (29%), and the Canadian province/territory of British
Columbia and Yukon (30%).

form since the 1985 Paciﬁc Salmon Treaty. Its main purpose is to
advise on the conservation of the Paciﬁc salmon to achieve optimum production and fair harvest allocation. The 1999 Canada-US
Paciﬁc Salmon Agreement (and subsequently the 2008 Agreement)
amended the 1985 treaty by improving the PSC’s process of
measuring stock abundance and setting commercial and recreational ﬁshing quotas (Miller 2003). The management of the Paciﬁc
salmon is a complex and politically sensitive endeavor owing to the
numerous biologically distinct ﬁsh stocks traveling through inland
rivers and ocean basins, across national and state borders, and
through multiple governance regimes (Ebbin, 2002). The organization is advised by ﬁve panels (Northern, Southern, Transboundary, Fraser River and Yukon River), each of which manages a
speciﬁc region and submits quota recommendations to a group of
commissioners appointed by Canada and the US, who then review
and forward the negotiated plans to the governments for ﬁnal
approval and regulatory implementation, or, in the case of the
Yukon River Panel, directly to the two governments (Miller, 2003).
Uniquely, the Fraser River Panel engages in the in-season regulation
of Fraser River-origin sockeye and pink salmon ﬁsheries within its
designated area including the decisions to open or close the ﬁshery.
Several joint technical committees support the overall process by
reporting relevant scientiﬁc information to the panels and commissioners. The secretariat, located in Vancouver, perform a variety
of functions, such as running ﬁeld programs, facilitating meetings,
preparing reports and providing technical information and scientiﬁc advice on stock assessment, ﬁsh biology and hydroacoustics
among others (PSC, 2016).

Survey analyses and results
Aggregate patterns of communication
For the 92 respondents who participated in the Paciﬁc salmon
study, a total of 388 formal and 350 informal communication
dyadic linkages were reported. From this, both the agencies with
which each respondent was afﬁliated and with which she
communicated were noted and classiﬁed according to the
jurisdiction to which the agencies belong. We used four jurisdictional groupings (US Federal, Alaska, Canadian Federal, Canadian province/territory) for enhanced analytical clarity, plus
the PSC and non-state actors. Having included 6 groupings
meant that a 66 adjacency matrix was used to create the
interjurisdictional communication network (i.e., 6 nodes).
Figure A1 presents the distribution of interjurisdictional
communication in the form of density visualization using VOSviewer 1.6.0. Node colour denotes the level of interjurisdictional
communication reported for each jurisdiction (i.e., the redder
the colour, the greater frequency of communication one node is
associated with other jurisdictions). The distance between
nodes indicates the intensity of relatedness such that closely
located nodes imply a proportionally higher occurrence of
communication between them.

Survey description
The Paciﬁc salmon data were collected during September and
October 2013, and consists of 92 complete survey responses. For
this survey, we restricted data to the region represented by the
Northern Panel of the PSC. All responses were anonymous with no
names or other identiﬁable information collected other than

Fig. A.1. Interjurisdictional communication pattern for governance networks pertaining to the Northern Panel of the Paciﬁc salmon ﬁsheries.
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being regularly or occasionally inﬂuenced by this organization
through informal means (0.647), while 80.1% of them reported
regular or occasional inﬂuence though formal means (0.801).
The PSC has the same percentage of respondents in the
network communicating with it as NOAA (which regulates ﬁshing in US federal waters) and more than any British Columbia
government agency (39.4%). Only four organizations are
communicated with more, and three of these are highly funded
regulatory agencies. Of the respondents that reported communicating with the PSC, 53.8% reported inﬂuence through informal
means, and 69.2% reported being inﬂuenced through formal
means. The inﬂuence of the PSC facilitated through informal
communication, such as phone calls, chance conversation and
social interactions was not remarkable. However, the inﬂuence of
the PSC determined through formal communication channels
that include committee meetings and ofﬁcial memo was relatively high, equivalent to that of national agencies such as Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO) and US Environmental Protection
Agency (USEPA) and even surpassing that of Alaska Department
of Fish and Game (ADFG). The overall portrait is of the Northern
Panel of PSC that is roughly or nearly equal in inﬂuence to the
national and sub-national public agencies governing the transboundary Paciﬁc salmon in southeast Alaska and northern British
Columbia.

As suggested by the node colour, communication is concentrated at, and between, the US Federal and the Alaska state agencies
(i.e., 341 and 329 units of communication, respectively), and on the
Canadian side, at and between the Canada Federal and the Province/Territory agencies (330 and 321). Meanwhile, markedly fewer
communication linkages were associated with the PSC (85). Such
patterns are not surprising given the typically a greater range of
responsibilities and resources that are at disposal with federal and
state agencies compared to international treaty secretariats. What
is strikingly depicted in this result, however, is the centrality of PSC
(as well as the non-state actors), implying its network-facilitating
role in the way the PSC communicates with the federal and subnational management bodies.
Estimating the size of inﬂuence
The survey results on interorganizational inﬂuence are presented in Table A.1 and graphically in Figure A.2. Of the 30 organizations included in the Paciﬁc salmon survey as choices for
respondents to report communicating with, we focused on the
top 10 organizations with the highest frequency. These organizations represented more than two thirds of all interorganizational contact reported in the survey. The calculation and
interpretation of the ﬁgure and table are the same as for Table 1
and Figure 2 in main body of the manuscript. For example, 51.5%
of non- US Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) employees reported communicating with USFWS. Of these, 64.7% indicated

Table A.1
The Effects of Formal & Informal Communication: Paciﬁc Salmon (Note: Standard errors in parenthesis).
Type

Org

Percent
Communicating

Occasional
þ Regular
Informal
Inﬂuence

Regular
Informal
Inﬂuence

Occasional
þ Regular
Formal
Inﬂuence

Regular
Formal
Inﬂuence

IO

Paciﬁc Salmon Commission (PSC)

0.394

0.538 (.080)

0.103
(.049)

0.692 (.074)

.231
(.067)

US
Federal

US Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA)

0.303

0.567 (.090)

0.700 (.084)

US Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS)

0.515

0.647 (.067)

US Forest Service (USFS)

0.343

0.500 (.086)

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)

0.394

0.590 (.079)

0.133
(.062)
0.137
(.048)
0.147
(.061)
0.103
(.049)

.300
(.084)
.235
(.059)
.235
(.073)
.179
(.061)

Canadian Environment Canada (ENVCAN)
Federal
Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO)

0.414

0.537 (.078)

0.525

0.596 (.068)

Alaska
State

0.444

0.568 (.075)

0.114
(.048)

0.636 (.073)

.250
(.065)

0.374

0.703 (.075)

0.784 (.068)

0.303

0.667 (.086)

0.216
(.068)
0.200
(.073)

.216
(.068)
.267
(.081)

Alaska Department of Fish and Game (ADFG)

BC
BC Ministry of Environment (BCME)
Provincial
BC Ministry of Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations
(BCMFLNRO)
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0.122
(.051)
0.135
(.047)

0.804 (.056)
0.735 (.076)
0.744 (.070)
0.732 (.069)
0.712 (.063)

0.800 (.073)

.171
(.059)
.173
(.052)
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